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WHY THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL WAS ALWAYS BOUND TO BREAK

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  In 2015, a historic deal was signed between Iran and the world powers to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. On paper, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) looked like a diplomatic victory. World leaders praised it as a sign that negotiation could work even between long-standing rivals. But if we step back and look at it through a more realistic lens, things start to look different. Personally, I’ve always found international politics fascinating because of how often “peace” is used as a public goal, when in reality, every country seems to be playing its own power game. That’s exactly what the JCPOA was less about peace, more about strategic timing.

In this piece, I want to look at the Iran nuclear deal using a theory called Realism in international relations. Realism basically says: countries aren’t friends. They’re players in a global game where everyone is looking out for their own interests mainly power and security. When you view the JCPOA through that lens, it becomes pretty clear why it didn’t last. Let’s be honest no country gives up a powerful bargaining chip like nuclear development just because they feel like being nice. Iran was under immense pressure when the deal was made. Sanctions were crushing its economy, people were suffering, and the government needed relief. Agreeing to the JCPOA bought Iran time. They promised to slow their nuclear program, but in return they got access to frozen funds, resumed oil exports, and eased financial pressure. From a Realist perspective, this wasn’t peace it was survival. Iran acted logically, based on what would help it stay afloat and protect its regional influence.

  On the other side, the U.S. and its allies had their own interests. Nobody wanted Iran to develop nuclear weapons, especially not in a region already full of tension. For the Obama administration, striking a deal was cheaper and less risky than going to war. But again, this was not about trust or friendship. It was about buying time, containing a threat, and boosting a diplomatic legacy. Realism says countries only cooperate when it helps them, and that’s exactly what was happening here. The U.S. wasn’t “helping” Iran it was managing a problem in a way that made sense for its own security. In 2018, everything changed. A new U.S. president, Donald Trump, pulled out of the deal, claiming it was weak and one-sided. Sanctions came back. Iran responded by slowly restarting its nuclear program. The whole thing unraveled fast. A lot of people were shocked. But if you follow Realist thinking, this wasn’t surprising at all. When the U.S. no longer saw the deal as useful, it left. Iran, in turn, had no reason to stick around either. Cooperation ends when interests no longer align. That’s how Realism explains the world there’s no world police, no guaranteed trust, only shifting strategies.

  To me, the JCPOA proves one thing: international cooperation is always conditional. Countries make deals when it helps them and break them just as easily when it doesn’t. That doesn’t mean diplomacy is useless, but it means we should be more honest about what drives it. From a Realist point of view, the Iran nuclear deal was never truly about ending conflict. It was a temporary pause in a much longer power struggle. Iran wanted sanctions relief. The U.S. wanted nuclear limits. Once those goals stopped matching up, so did the deal.

  Studying international politics with Realism in mind is both sobering and clarifying. You start to see the patterns: cooperation built on convenience, not conviction. Agreements like the JCPOA might look like breakthroughs, but they’re more like temporary ceasefires in a bigger competition. At the end of the day, countries act in their own interest. And unless we change the rules of the game, that’s the way it’ll stay.

  What’s interesting is that the JCPOA isn’t a one-time example. If we look at other international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord, the North Korean denuclearization talks, or even NATO we can see the same Realist logic at play. States join or leave agreements based on what suits them best at a given moment. Take North Korea, for example. Multiple talks have been held to try to denuclearize the regime. Sometimes there are agreements, photo-ops, and hopeful headlines. But they never last. Why? Because North Korea uses negotiations as leverage to get sanctions relief or international recognition but they don’t intend to give up something so strategically valuable without absolute guarantees. And honestly, no guarantee is ever truly absolute in international politics.

The same pattern applies to powerful democracies. When the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord under Trump, it was not because the science changed. It was because the administration saw it as economically damaging to American industries. Again, national interest over global cooperation. This isn’t cynicism it’s clarity. Realism doesn’t assume leaders are evil or selfish. It just acknowledges that, in a system where there is no higher global authority, self-preservation becomes the top priority. And that often limits how far cooperation can go.

  That’s the big question. If Realism is right and in many ways, the JCPOA proves it is then how can the world ever move beyond short-term deals and start building lasting peace?

Maybe the answer lies in recognizing Realism, not rejecting it. Instead of pretending trust exists where it doesn’t, agreements could be designed with built-in mechanisms that reflect how states actually behave. Contingencies, incentives, and mutual pressure might be more effective than idealistic promises. In the end, understanding the world as it is may be the first step toward changing it.

REFERENSI

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action

https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/files/162537010/Beck_ResourceCenter_IranDeal_1.pdf

https://ensani.ir/file/download/article/674c1d31074af-9665-1403-11.pdf

https://www.stimson.org/2024/an-acute-power-imbalance-helped-doom-the-iran-nuclear-deal/